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In: Proceedings of the international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems. Brown N, Sandholm T Regret-based pruning in extensive-form games. Brown N, Sandholm T Strategy-based warm starting for regret minimization in games.
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PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In: Eighth symposium on abstraction, reformulation, and approximation. Risk NA, Szafron D Using counterfactual regret minimization to create competitive multiplayer poker agents. In: Proceedings of the 9th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems, vol 1. In: Twenty-second international joint conference on artificial intelligence. In: Proceedings of the 29th international coference on international conference on machine learning.
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Blair A, Saffidine A Ai surpasses humans at six-player poker. Download references. We thank all the researchers in this field. You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. Abstract - Cited by 72 11 self - Add to MetaCart Recently, algorithms for computing game-theoretic solutions have been deployed in real-world security applications, such as the placement of checkpoints and canine units at Los Angeles International Airport.
These algorithms assume that the defender security personnel can commit to a mixed strategy, a so-called Stackelberg model. As pointed out by Kiekintveld et al. Kiekintveld et al. In this paper, we study how to compute optimal Stackelberg strategies in such games, showing that this can be done in polynomial time in some cases, and is NP-hard in others. FOCS , We reexamine what it means to compute Nash equilibria and, more generally, what it means to compute a fixed point of a given Brouwer function, and we investigate the complexity of the associated problems.
Abstract - Cited by 68 8 self - Add to MetaCart We reexamine what it means to compute Nash equilibria and, more generally, what it means to compute a fixed point of a given Brouwer function, and we investigate the complexity of the associated problems.
We show similar results for market equilibria: it is hard to estimate with any nontrivial accuracy the equilibrium prices in an exchange economy with a unique equilibrium, where the economy is given by explicit algebraic formulas for the excess demand functions.
We define a class, FIXP, which captures search problems that can be cast as fixed point. We consider the problem of routing n users on m parallel links under the restriction that each user may only be routed on a link from a certain set of allowed links for the user. So, this problem is equivalent to the correspondingly restricted scheduling problem of assigning n jobs to m parallel mac Abstract - Cited by 59 12 self - Add to MetaCart We consider the problem of routing n users on m parallel links under the restriction that each user may only be routed on a link from a certain set of allowed links for the user.
So, this problem is equivalent to the correspondingly restricted scheduling problem of assigning n jobs to m parallel machines. In a Nash equilibrium, no user may improve its own Individual Cost latency by unilaterally switching to another link from its set of allowed links.
For identical links, we present, as our main result, a polynomial time algorithm to compute from any given assignment a Nash equilibrium with non-increased makespan. The algorithm gradually transforms the assignment by pushing the unsplittable user traffics through a flow network, which is constructed from the users and the links.
The algorithm uses ideas from blocking flows. We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish and non-colluding agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the centrally controlled soc We can do the same analysis with each choice, to see where all of the circles should go.
The cell with both payoffs circled is a Nash equilibrium. Remember that it is possible to have a payoff matrix with no Nash equilibrium. Tags game theory microeconomics. Posted by Jeff. Labels: game theory , microeconomics. Newer Post Older Post Home. Ask a question search this site. Common Topics algebra 34 economics 50 glossary 25 macroeconomics 57 microeconomics supply and demand Popular Posts.
What is the difference between endogenous and exogenous variables, considering the determinates of demand. This post was updated in September with new information and examples.
One of the things to do when analyzing a supply and dema Legalize marijuana? The case for legalized marijuana with taxes. The following information is found on many places on the web, and some have asked questions about the economics occuring in the passage Demand side externalities. Externalities can be either positive or negative.
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